Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1961

United Steelworkers of America et al v. Board of
Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah et al :
Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Walter L. Budge; Fred F. Dremann; Parsons, Behle, Evans & Moffat; Elliott W. Evans; Attorneys for
Respondents;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, United Steelworkers of America v. Industrial Comm. Of Utah, No. 9322 (Utah Supreme Court, 1961).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3778

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

l EQ

of the__r:__j
STATE OF Ul1\H

Ft·n

'")

....

l

-· '"",
~

· -

'"'·U
·
1 "~I

~·

Case No. 9322
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 5486,
for and on behalf of its members employed by Utah Copper Division,
Kennecott Copper Corporation, 60-BR-230;
INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND SMELTER
WORKERS, LOCALS 485 and 392, for and on behalf of its members
employed by Utah Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation,
and OFFICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL
286, for and on behalf of its members employed by Utah Copper
Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 60-BR-237;
ELVERE R. DAVIS, on his own behalf, employed by Utah Copper
Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 60-BR-231;
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS (Local 1438), for and on behalf of its members employed by
Utah Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, and DEON
L. WIMMER and LEONARD HUSSEY, 60-BR-235;
UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4347, 4413,
S120 and 4329, for and on behalf of its members employed by Utah
Copper Division, Kennecott Copper Corporation, 60-BR-236,
Appellants
vs.

BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, and the
UTAH COPPER DIVISION OF KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION,
Respondents

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN
Special Assistant Attorney General
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & MOFFAT
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
Attorneys for Respondents
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX
Page
NATURE 0 F 1'HE CASE ------------------------------------------------------ 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ---------------------------------------------------- 5
STATEMENT OF POINTS -------------------------------------------------- 11
ARGUMENT _______________ -------------------_____ _____ ____ ____ ___ _____ ______________ 12
Point One-The Board of Review did not err as a matter
of law and fact in denying the claimants benefits in
holding:
( 1) That the Utah Copper Division, Kennecott
Copper Corporation, operation in Utah constitutes a single factory or establishment within
the meaning of the Act, Section 35-4-5 (d) ------ 12
Point Two-the Board of Review did not err as a matter
of law and fact in denying the claimants benefits in
holding:
( 2) That the work stoppage did not end until February 6, 1960, when the plant resumed nnormal
operations" for:
(a) That workers represented by United Steelworkers of American, Local 5486;
(b) The workers represented by International
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
1438;
(c) The workers represented by International
Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers,
Locals 485 and 392;
(d) The workers represented by International
Union of Office Employees, Local 286;
(e) The workers represented by United Steelworkers of America, Locals 4329, 4347,
4413 and 5120;
(f) Elvere R. Davis, individually, and as a member of his local union ------------------------------------ 20
Point Three-The Board of Review did not err as a matter
of law and fact in denying the claimants benefits in
holding:
( 3) That the unemployment of the claimant rep, resented by the local unions set forth in 2. (a

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
through f in point of argument No. 2) was due
to a stoppage of work which existed because of a
strike involving his grade, class, or group of
workers at the factory or establishment at which
he is or was last employed_________________________________ 24
CONCLUSI 0 N ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 40
CASES CITED
American Steel Foundries v. Gordon et al, 404 Ill. 174,
88 N .E. 2d 46 5 ---------------------------------------------------------------Bako et al, v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 171 Pa. Supr. 222, 90 A. 2d 309 -------------------------Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v. Review Board of the
Indiana Employment Security Division et al, 117 Ind.
App. 379, 72 N .E. 2d 662 ---------------------------------------------Chrysler Corporation v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division et al, 120 Ind. App. 425, 92
W.E. 2d 565 ( 1950) -----------------------------------------------------Employees of Utah Fuel Company of Clear Creek, Utah, vs.
Industrial Commission of Utah, 99 Utah 88, 104 P.2d
19 7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------Fort Pitt Manufacturing Company v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa. Supr. 162, 106 A.
2d 672 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------Gus P. Lexes et al v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 243
p. 2d 964 -------------------------------------------------------------------------Olof Nelson Construction Company et al v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 121 Utah 525, 243 P. 2d 951 __________
Park v. Appeal Board of Michigan (January 12, 1959), 359
Mich. 103, 94 N .W. 2d 407 -------------------------------------------Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Industrial Commission
of Utah, 41 A. 104, 139 P. 2d 208 -------------------------------Spielman vs. Industrial Commission, 236 Wisconsin 240,
29 5 N. W. 1 ----------------··---------------------------------------------------

32
31

29

28

25

32
32
14
15
32
17

STATUTES
lTtah Code Annotated, 19 53
35-4-5 (d) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

UNITED STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL NO. 5486, et al,
Appellants,

Case No.
9322

vs.
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
et al,

Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondents agree v1ith the statement of appellant as to
the nature of the case insofar as it goes and supplement it as
follows:
There are five categories of claims for unemployment compensation benefits involved in this appeal. They are as follows:
( 1) Claims filed for waiting weeks or weeks of unemployment
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during periods when picketing was being maintained at the
entrances used by the claimants; ( 2) claims filed for weeks of
unemployment for periods which occurred after a labor-management contract had been reached when no pickets were maintained at the entrances used by the claimants; ( 3) claims filed
by workers who were normally employed at the smelter after
the completion of the processing of the stockpile at the smelter;
( 4) claims filed by refinery workers after the date of the contract settlement vtho were not called back to work due to the
deterioration at the refinery which necessitated repair work
prior to the resumption of normal operations; ( 5) claims filed
by refinery workers for weeks of unemployment following the
January shutdown of refinery furnaces. We set these out for
the information of the Court. All classes are in our opinion
subject to disqualification for the same reasons.
Basically the issue is this: May the members of one union
who participated in a simultaneous strike with members of
several other unions escape from the disqualifying provisions
of Section 3 5-4-5 (d) of the Employment Security Act by reason
of the fact that through the union they reached a contract settlement prior to the time when all other unions reached contract
settlements which would permit the resumption of normal operations and an end of the work stoppage? Put another way: Can
striking members who are responsible for a work stoppage
become eligible for unemployn1ent compensation benefits prior
to the end of the work stoppage when such work stoppage continues by reason of the fact that other unions are still on strike
in one or more other segments of the establishment?
The weeks for which unemployment benefits are claimed
are for weeks of unemployment which occurred subsequent to
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respective contract settlements and prior to the resumption of
normal or substantial operations. In the case of the members
of the international Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local
No. 1438, the claims include some claims which were for periods
prior to the date of the contract settlement of that local but during periods when active picketing was in progress at the entrance to the plant which was used by those claimants.
Elvere R. Davis was employed as a carpenter at the company's mill and was a member of Local 392, Mine, Mill and
Smelter Workers' Union. He originally appealed to the Referee
on the issue of whether or not intervening employment after
the date of the strike would relieve him from the strike disqualification. Upon receiving an adverse decision, Davis filed
a written appeal to the Board of Review on the sole issue of
whether or not members of Local 392, Mine, Mill and Smelter
Workers' Union including himself were eligible for benefits.
He did not appeal on the issue of the intervening employment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appeals Referee in his decisions and particularly in
those involving steelworker locals and mine mill locals made
very comprehensive Findings of Fact. BR-230 (R. 011, 012),
BR-231 (R. 008, 009), BR-235 (R. 027, 028), BR-236 (R 102108), BR-23 7 (R. 82-86). His Findings appear to be accepted by
all parties to this appeal with perhaps only minor differences
v1hich are of little consequence. Nowhere in appellant's brief
do they point out where any of these Findings of Fact are not
supported by the evidence.
Under the heading, nStaten1ent of the Case," appellants

5
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in their brief set forth certain facts. Respondents agree generally
with the statement of facts therein set forth but call attention
to what appears to be statements made in error and not supported by the record and direct attention to additional facts.
While the Electrical Workers Local 1438, as set forth on
page 5 of appellants' brief, advised the Company on October 31,
1959, that it was not on strike and in turn ordered the Unity
Council not to list that local as one of the striking unions in
either their advertisements, publicity or demands to the Company. This same union had, by press release dated August 12,
1959, two days after the commencement of the strike, identified
itself as one of the unions in Utah Unity Council which had
that day ((established a joint strike committee for the purpose
of uniting the efforts of all striking local unions in the Utah
Division in a combined effort to win this strike and effectuate
a substantial contract from the Company***." BR-235 (R.
004) . The union, prior to the commencement of the strike on
August 10, 1959, had been requested by the Company to furnish men to maintain the power plant during the strike and
supply switchboard operators. These men did not show up for
work on the day of the strike and thereafter until November
12, 1959. The members of the union refused to cross the picket
lines to go to work. BR-235 (R. 071).
The Central Power Station was not operated during the
strike not only for the reason that it was not economically
feasible to operate the plant for the production of the relatively
small amount of power which was needed by the Company
in its strike-curtailed operation, but also because it was unsafe
to do so for such a small output. BR-236 (R. 070, 183, 184).

6
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While it is true that as stated on page 9 of appellants·
brief that when pickets appeared at the smelter on the afternoon
shift of Decen1ber 1, 1959, the smelter employees did not leave
their jobs, the production workers merely finished the shift
they were then working and refused thereafter to cross the picket
line to return to work on subsequent shifts and did not return
to \Vork until the picket lines were withdrawn. The clerical
workers returned after only one day of absence and refusal to
cross the picket line.
The Utah Copper Division of Kennecott Copper Corporation is engaged in Salt Lake County in the mining, milling,
smelting and refining business. It operates a mine and precipitation plant at Bingham, two concentration plants (mills at
lviagna and Arthur), a smelter, a refinery, a Central Power
Station all near Magna and a vast railroad system; at the mine,
from the mine to the waste dumps, from the mine to assembly
yards, from the assembly yards to the mills and connecting the
mills, smelter and refinery. BR-236 (R. 119).
The basis or foundation of all activity in the Utah Copper
Division is its open-cut mine at Bingham Canyon.
Before ore can be removed from the mine, waste or overburden of about twice the amount of ore ren1oved must first be
removed and hauled to \vaste dumps. BR-236 (R. 025, Page 10,
Exhibit B), BR-237 (R. 137). Over these v;aste dumps water
is distributed and permitted to percolate through them, in the
process picking up copper from the waste in the dumps. At the
base of the dumps the water is recaptured and taken to the
precipitation plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon where
the copper is ren1oved therefrom. BR-237 (R. 137).

7
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Ore from the mine is loaded by electric shovels into railroad
cars and taken by train from the mine to the assembly yard and
at the assembly yard a larger number of cars are assembled together for transporting by railroad to the mills. The ore is processed at the mills and the concentrates taken from there to the
smelter by railroad, and after smelting, the product is then
taken by railroad to the refinery for refining. BR-236 (R. 127),
BR-237 (R. 137).
Each process or operation is dependent upon all of the
others. For example, without the removal of ore from the mine,
the train crews cannot operate. Likewise, without the train crews
operating in any one of the areas in which they operate, i.e.,
removal of waste, moving of ore from the mine to the assembly
yard and from the assembly yard to the mills, the mills, smelter
and refinery cannot operate. Another example is that if the
mine, railroads, mills and refinery are not in operation, the Central Power Station will not operate because its sole purpose is
to supply power used at the mine, railroads and other plants
mentioned.
The last of the unions to reach contract settlements with
the Company were International Association of Machinists,
Local 568, System Federation No. 155 and Brotherhood of
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Lodge 844. Settlen1ents
were reached on January 27, 1960. BR-236 (R. 029).
The employees represented by the International Association of Machinists, Local 568, are the maintenance group at
the mine who maintain the equipment which is used by the
various units throughout the open-pit mine. They maintain the
shovels, locomotives, track shifters, angle dozers, trucks and
other equipment used in the operation of the mine. Without

8
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the services of the men represented by this union, there could
be operation only for a short time before breakdowns woulJ
stop the operation. BR-237 (R. 138).
'fhe System Federation No. 15 5 compnses a group of
labor unions, members of which are machinists, blacksmiths,
boiler makers and the car repairmen located in the shops of the
ore haulage at the Magna mills. These men service and maintain the railroad operating equipment, including the electric
locomotives which haul the ore and service the dumping of the
ore and the diesel locomotives which haul the concentrates
from the mills to the smelter and the delivery of supplies. Without the services of these men, it would be impossible to operate
the mills. BR-237 (R. 148, 149).
The men represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen operate the trains in the Bingham
open-pit mine. They travel to the shovels and haul waste to the
dumps and ore to the Copperton assembly yard. Without the
services of these men, there would be no move1nent of waste
or ore. BR-237 (R. 137, 138).
The n1anagement, operation, direction and control of all
departments is on a Utah Copper Division basis with headquarters in Salt Lake City in most instances and generally in
the Kearns Building. There is a general manager with offices
in the Kearns Building, Salt Lake City. BR-236 (R. 120). Under
him there are the superintendents of the mine, mills, refinery
and smelter with offices at the respective plants. There is a
central accounting office in Salt Lake City which handles the
accounting for all the plants. BR-236 (R. 121). Payroll checks
are made up in the central accounting office for all employees

9
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of Utah Copper Division. The Comptroller's Department, Industrial and Union Relations Department, Purchasing Department, Engineering Department, Industrial Engineering Department, Quality Control Department, Safety Department and
Security Force are all on a Utah Copper Division basis. BR-236
(R. 121, 138, 139).
The important fact concerning the stoppage of production
at the smelter after it had resumed production upon the settlement reached with the steelworkers on November 21, 1959,
which stoppage commenced during the week ending January
10, 1960, was that there were no more concentrates at the smelter
to process and none was being received from the mills, which
lack of concentrates was the result of the strike which had comtnenced on August 10, 1959. There had been about 34,000 tons
of concentrates stockpiled at the smelter prior to the strike.
When these concentrates were smelted, operations were forced
to cease on January 17, 1960. BR-236 (R. 162). This was not
only the reason given, as stated by appellants on page 10 of their
brief, but was the fact and there was no evidence to the contrary.
The resumption of operations at the refinery, following
the contract settlements with the United Steelworkers of America on November 21, 1959, first consisted of preliminary heating
of furnaces, clearing up fallen cathodes and general cleanup in
the tank house. Operations were planned to resume as rapidly
as possible with fine casting being scheduled to begin on
December 7, 1959. Picket lines of Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen and Order of Railroad Carmen and
Brakemen were established on December 1, 1959. This interrupted operations again until December 25, 1959, when the

10
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pickets v;ere withdra\vn. There was a limited supply of materials
on hand for refining and this was depleted on January 15,
1960. BR-236 (R. 144). The failure of Systems Federation and
the Company to reach agreement prior to January 27, 1960,
prevented the product of the stnelter from being delivered to
the refinery, which product was necessary before the refinery
could operate.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS l1.
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING:
1. THAT UTAH COPPER DIVISION, KENNECOTT
COPPER CORPORATION, OPERATION IN UTAH
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT,
SECTION 5(d).
2. THAT THE WORI< STOPPAGE DID NOT END

UNTIL FEBRUARY 6, 1960, WHEN THE
RESUMED ((NORMAL OPERATIONS" FOR:

PLANT

(a) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5486;
(b) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1438;
(c) TI-IE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-

II
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NATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND
SMELTER WORKERS, LOCALS 485 AND 392;
(d) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OFFICE EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 286;

(e) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4329,
4347, 4413 AND 5120; AND

(f) EL VERE R. DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
A MEMBER OF HIS LOCAL UNION.
3. THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS REPRESENTED BY THE LOCAL UNIONS SET'
FORTH IN 2. (a through£ above) WAS DUE TO A
WORK STOPPAGE WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE OF A
STRIKE INVOLVING HIS GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP
OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH HE IS OR WAS LAST EMPLOYED.

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING:
1. THAT UTAH COPPER DIVISION, KENNECOTT

COPPER CORPORATION, OPERATION IN UTAI-I
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE FACTORY OR ESTABLISH-

12
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t\lENT

\\liTHIN

TI-IE

MEANING

OF

THE

ACT,

SECTION 5(d).
SECTION 3 5-4-5 (d) of the Utah Employment Security
Act provides:
5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or
for purposes of establishing a waiting period:
(I

(d) For any week in which it is found by the COITlmission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage
of \vork \vhich exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or
establishment at which he is or was last employed.
n

n

1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall

(

find that a strike has been fomented by a v;-orker of
any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class,
or group of workers of the individual who is found
to be a party of such plan or agreement to foment a
strike, shall be eligible for benefits; provided, however,
that if the commission, upon investigation, shall find
that such strike is caused by the failure or refusal of
any employer to conform to the provisions of any law
of the State of Utah, or the United States, pertaining
to hours, wages or other conditions of work, such strike
shall not render the workers ineligible for benefits.
n

(

2) If the commission upon investigation, shall

find that the employer, his agent, or representative,
has conspired, planned or agreed with any of his workers, their agents or representatives, to foment a strike,
such strike shall not render the workers ineligible fo ~
benefits.''
The question of whether or not the Utah Copper Division,
Kennecott Copper Corporation, operations in Utah constitute
a single factory or establishment within the meaning of the 1\ct
appears to us to be of secondary importance except as to the

13
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effect such interpretation has on the matter or resumption of
normal or substantial operations at the smelter or refinery.
The matter of what constitutes a single factory or establishment has never been decided by this Court under a similar factual situation. This Court did say in the case of Olof Nelson
Construction Company et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
121 Utah 525, 243 P 2d 951, in a case which involved multiple
bargaining units:
''The strike was called for and on behalf of every
employee covered by the agreement. It, therefore,
directly involved all these claimants at each particular
place of employment at which they were last employed. The strike was fomented by claimants through
their duly authorized union representatives."
Although the facts show that at times each of the local
unions presented certain common bargaining demands in the
field of health and welfare benefits through a "Unity Council,"
the Referee and the Board of Review did not make specific
findings that the various strike actions were taken to enforce the
specific health and welfare demands of the Unity Council. It
was recognized that except in the area of health and welfare
benefits the designated unions were the sole bargaining agents
for the respective units. It is significant that the respective local
unions all effected a strike simultaneously on August 10.
We have reviewed numerous cases involving the definitions
of single factory or establishment and in none of these cases
are the facts parallel to the situation in the instant case. Had
the facts in the other cases paralleled those in the instant case,
the matter of whether or not a certain plant was part of the
factory or establishment would not have been the salient factor

14
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in the appeal. In the other cases there were no formal strikes
at the premises where the benefit claimants were employed. In
the instant case there were simultaneous strikes at each and
every segment of the company operations. In the other cases
the claims dated from the original work stoppage which came
about by reason of the lack of materials flowing from the struck
premises which were located at some distance from the struck
operation. In the instant case the claims for benefits are made
for \veeks either during which time strikes were in active progress and picketing was being maintained or for weeks which
followed a settlement of the particular local's contract.
As we pointed out, in the other cases the work stoppage
resulted from a lack of materials and in the instant case the
work stoppage was a direct result of the strike of August 10.
Generally speaking, in the other cases the appeals involved outof -state plants or plants which were forty or more miles distant.
In the instant case the operation constitutes one industrial community-it is all within the state and within a limited integrated
area. In the cases to be reviewed there was no voluntary act on
the part of the employees who were appealing, and in the instant
case all of the appellants or benefit claimants were either active! y on strike on August 10 or were honoring picket lines and
thereby involved in the strike. In the other cases there was no
showing that there was a direct interest or direct participation
by the appellants. In the instant case each of the appellants was
a participating and interested party.
The foregoing factual analysis applies in almost all respects
to the case of Park vs. Appeal Board of Michigan, decided on
January 12, 1959, 359 Michigan 103, 94 N.W. 2d 407, which
case is relied on to a substantial extent by Counsel for the Appel-

15
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I ants in his brief. That case held in substance that the '' functiona! integration" of an employer's plants that are located in
more than one state does not make the plant per se a "single
establishment'' within the meaning of the Law and that, therefore, the employees who were out of work in Michigan as a
result of a strike against their employer in Ohio were not disqualified under the labor dispute provisions of the Law where
such employees did not strike or picket but were laid off. The
Court stated in discussing the question at issue:
~~

... We conclude that they turn upon the answer
to a relatively simple legal question-does the term
'the establishment' as used in the Michigan Employment Security Act encompass both Ford plants in the
vicinity of Detroit, Michigan, and the Ford Forge plant
at Canton, Ohio, for the reason that the former cannot
operate long without the latter."
To further point out that the Court recognized differences
tn factual situations in its rationalization of other cases, we
quote:
('While the dictionary, the statute, and common sense
all argue otherwise, we are urged that this Court ·in
Chrysler Corporation vs. Smith, 297 Michigan 438, so
defined (establishment' as to require our holding as
did the Circuit Judge and the Appeal Board that the
Ford Detroit area plants in Michigan and the Ford
Canton Forge plant in Ohio were all one (establishment'.
('It might be noted at the outset that no such factual
situation was involved in Chrysler vs. Smith as confronts us here. The plants there involved were all in
one industrial community-the Detroit area; they \Y~re
all located within eleven miles of one another; and they
were all located in the State of Michigan. We deal

16
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here with a disqualification argument applicable to
nonstriking employees in three Detroit area plants
all in Michigan where the strike inducing the unemployment occurred in another community 150 miles
away and in another state."
The Court discussed the case of Spielmann vs. Industrial
CommiJsion, 236 Wisconsin 240, 295 N.W. 1, and said in
answer to the Ford Motor Company's argument:
"Factually the Wisconsin case was even more remote
from our present facts since the two plants there held
to be one 'establishment' within the meaning of the
Wisconsin statute were both in the same state though
forty miles apart, were both under one general works
manager, and were operated on one production schedule
maintained by trucks scheduled between the two plants
with deliveries so synchronized that a body built for
one order at Milwaukee would meet the chasis for the
same order built at Kanosha on the assembly line without intermediate storage.
''On the other hand, the record in the cases considered
herewith indicates for all plants concerned entirely
separate and distinct plant managers and plant production schedules as well as separate and distinct industrial relations and employment offices, employment
seniority lists, local unions and local labor management
agreements.''
In the instant case we have one industrial community, i.e.,
the Utah Copper Division where the administration of the production operations is carried on under the General Manager
of the Division with a Superintendent of Mines, Superintendent
of Mills, Refinery Supervisor, Smelter Supervisor and Superintendent of the auxiliary units including the power station,
precipitation plant and ore haulage system reporting directly
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to the General Manager. The Utah Division consists of the
open-pit mine separated only by a few miles from the two
mills, refinery, precipitation plant, central power stations with
a general company-owned haulage system operating between
all segments of the operations. The Utah Division maintains
a central accounting office tn Salt Lake City, and all of the
various plant operations and all payroll records and checks for
all employees of the Utah Division are made up in this central
accounting section in Salt Lake City. The purchasing, industrial
and union relations, employment and employee training, engineering, quality control, safety, security, and production schedules all emanate from a central point in the division headquarters in Salt Lake City. As in the Spielmann case referred to in
the Park case supra, the operations at all of the segments of the
establishment are so integrated as to make the continuous flow
of production each dependent upon the other. A stoppage of
the flow of ore from the mine to the mills or a stoppage in the
ore haulage operation would inunediately shut down the entire
establishment including the mine, the mills, the smelter and the
refinery.
The appellants in their brief, pages 16 through 18, point
out how in their opinion certain factors governing contracts,
wages, etc., show the separateness of the segments of the operations of the Utah Division. In relating the argument to the
situation at hand, we find that the facts are neither black nor
white. The United Steelworkers of America negotiates contracts
for Local 4413, production and maintenance workers at the
refinery; Local 5120, clerical workers at the company's refinery;
Local 4347, production and maintenance workers at the company smelter; Local 4329, clerical workers at the smelter; and
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Local 5486, technical workers at the company's Arthur Mills.
The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers
negotiates for Local 392, production and maintenance employees
at the company's Arthur and Magna Mills, and Local 485, production and maintenance workers at the company's Bingham
Mine. The facts show that the Unity Council presented demands
dealing with health and welfare, and these demands included
more than one segment of the company's operations. General
hiring practices were dictated from the company's office in Salt
Lake City even though the actual hiring of individuals may
have been done at the several work locations. Labor contract
negotiations were carried out not between the administrative
personnel of the smelter or the refinery, etc., and the unions but
behveen the unions and the company representatives located in
Salt Lake City. The negotiations were done with the same general personnel for all of the segments of the operation. Safety
and security measures in all of the operational segments were
directed and controlled from the Salt Lake City office. There
was one central source of payroll records and payrolls. The
integrated nature of operations was apparently recognized by
the various union locals themselves when they organized the
Unity Council whose main purpose seems to have been to bring
about some general uniformity in the provisions dealing with
health and welfare.
As we pointed out tn the beginning, the question of
\vhether or not the Utah Division operations constituted one
factory or establishment is a rather academic one in view of the
fact that all the claimants herein were directly involved and
participated in the strikes of August 10, which strikes were in
effect at each and every segment of the company operations.
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Had there been no strike at some of the work locations, then
it would have been imperative that we determine first whether
or not this was one establishment, and then second that we
determine whether or not the claimants were involved in the
strike.
Hovv?e..~?e:, ~ . .:e~ taking the most liberal interpretation of
the cases defining the word, ·'establishment,'' we do not see
where a substantial case can be made which would support the
conclusion that the Utah Division was anything other than a
single establishment. Its administration and operations and
employee matters were so functionally integrated that we fail
to see wherein the Appeals Referee or the Board of ·Reviev·
could have reached a different conclusion other than that within
the meaning of the Law that this was a single "establishment.''

ARGUMENT
POINT TWO

I

THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING:
2. THAT THE WORK STOPPAGE DID NOT END

UNTIL FEBRUARY 6, 1960, WHEN THE
RESUMED "NORMAL OPERATIONS" FOR:

PLANT

(a) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5486;

(b) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
CAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1438;

ELECTRI-
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(c) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTERNATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND
SMELTER WORKERS, LOCALS 485 AND 392;

(d) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OFFICE EMPLOYEES,
LOCAL 286;

(e) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4329,
4347, 4413 AND 5120; AND

(f) ELVERE R. DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS
A MEMBER OF HIS LOCAL UNION.
We are concerned in this point of argument primarily with
what did happen between August 10, 1959, and February 6,
1960, with reference to resumption of operations in the Utah
Copper Division. We reserve any argument as to cause and
effect of the unemployment during that period to our number
3 point of argument. The findings of the Board that the work
stoppage did not end until February 6, 1960, can best be supported by a brief review of the facts regarding the resumption
of work.
Anticipating a vacation shutdown schedule which was to
commence August 10 and end August 23, 1959, for all employees except those employed at the smelter and refinery, the
company had stockpiled concentrates at the smelter which
would have enabled the smelter and refinery to operate on a
steady basis for that two-week period. When the unions' intention to strike effective August 10 was announced, the company
canceled the vacation schedule. On November 21, 1959, follow-
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ing ratification of their new contract agreements, steelworkers
Locals 4347 and 4329 commenced a return to work at the
smelter to process the two-week supply of ore. Between November 22 and November 24, 1959, 708 smelter employees were
back to work while 167 smelter employees were scheduled off.
All but 96 of the 1,170 of the smelter workers had returned to
work by November 30-BR-236 (R. 059). The smelter clerical
employees were called back according to seniority qualifications
as work became available.
On the afternoon shift of December 1, 1959, pickets \vere
established by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and
Enginemen and Order of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen at the
entrance to the smelter. The smelter employees who were working at that time remained through the work shift. They did
not, however, return to work on subsequent shifts because of the
picket line until December 25, 1959, when the pickets were
withdrawn by the railroad brotherhoods who had by then signed
new contract agreements. On November 2 5 a general recall of
the production and maintenance and clerical workers began at
the smelter to con1plete the job of processing the stockpile. During the week ending January 10, 1960, the company began
laying off the smelter workers because of the exhaustion of the
stockpile ore. The layoffs continued according to plant seniority
so that on January 18, 1960, there were only 242 employees
working at the smelter and these were engaged in the work of
maintenance, cleanup, and material inventory. Some of the
clerical and technical employees at the smelter were told on
January 20 not to report for work until further notice because
there was no work available for them. Those who were laid off
because of the exhaustion of the ore supply and lack of ,,·ork
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were subject to recall on February 1 and shortly thereafter. By
February 4, 1960, all but 114 workers out of the 1,153 had
returned to \vork at the smelter. We are concerned here with
the unemployment of those workers who were not kept on to do
available maintenance, cleanup, and material inventory. There
was no ore available at the smelter comn1encing with the week
ending January 10. These facts appear in the record-BR-236
(R. 058-061) and Company Exhibits K and L.
The situation at the refinery was somewhat different, BR236 (R. 040-042). The new labor agreement for the refinery
workers was ratified on November 21, 1959. During the week
of November 23 four hundred employees of the steelworkers
Local 4413 were called back to work at the refinery. The remaining three hundred workers were not called back. When the con1pany attempted to operate the refinery after November 21, they
found that extensive repair and tnaintenance work was necessary
before any production work could be commenced. The cathodes
and anodes at the refinery which were in place at the end of
the strike called on August 10 had frozen in to such an extent
that production was not possible. Those workers who were
not called back to work remained unemployed due to the condition of the refinery. The others primarily did maintenance
and repair work.
On December 1, 1959, the picket lines established by the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and Order
of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen prevented the refinery \vorkers from entering the refinery. When those picket lines were
withdrawn on December 25, the recall of the refinery workers
commenced. BR-236 (R. 105-106). Two of the three refinery
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furnaces were closed January 4 to January 15, 1960, with one
continuing until January 29, 1960. Thereafter production and
maintenance work was not resumed at the refinery until February 8, 1960. The last of the contract settlements was dated
January 27, 1960, and by February 6 substantial operations had
been resumed throughout the establishment. Reserving our
argument for Point 3 as to cause in effect in the unemployment,
it appears clear that there was a work stoppage existing in the
plant which caused the unemployment of the majority of the
workers during the period in question and the Board of Review
could not have found otherwise. In fact, these claims for benefits involved herein are based on that very work stoppage. There
could be no resumption of normal or substantial operations
until all of the contract negotiations had been completed since
a holdout by one or more of the unions at any particular point
in the production would necessarily prevent such resumption.

ARGUMENT
POINT THREE
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A
MATTER OF LAWT AND FACT IN DENYING THE
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING:
3. THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIMANTS REPRESENTED BY THE LOCAL UNIONS SET
FORTH IN 2. (a through f in point of argument No. 2)
WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH
EXISTED BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING HIS
GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE
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FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH HE IS
OR WAS LAST EMPLOYED.
Here we come to the crux of the problem. Can claimants
who participated in a simultaneous strike with members of
other unions escape from the disqualification of the Act (Sections 5 (d), by reason of the fact that their union has reached a
contract settlement prior to the time when all union members
of all unions reached settlements which will permit the resumption of normal operations. In other words, can individuals who
create a work stoppage through the medium of a strike escape
the responsibility for the work stoppage. In this and other states
the principle of relating the responsibility for the work stoppage
to the party who caused the stoppage is well settled.
This Court in the case of Employees of Utah Fuel Company
of Clear Creek, Utah, vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 99
Utah 88, 104 P 2d 197, briefly considered a question of whether
or not the stoppage of work was due to a strike or due to company action. We quote briefly from that decision:
CtPetitioners assert that the Utah Fuel Company
started to repair its tipple and do other construction
work during this period in question and that the portion
of the mine wherein work was being prosecuted was
practically out; that therefore the company was not
in a position to mine coal and did not have work for
petitioners. From this they reason that the stoppage
was not due to a strike. Whatever the facts be, we think
them immaterial. After the company was notified and
the men left work, it matters not what the company
did at its mine until the dispute was settled and the
strike over. There is no evidence that the company
caused the stoppage of work (other than the May 4th
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night shift already discussed). The strike caused the
stoppage.
((There was a conflict on whether or not the company had orders for coal and therefore would have
mined coal, had the strike not been called. This, too,
is immaterial. If workers walk out on a strike and
refuse to return, except on a certain contingency, their
unemployment is due to a strike regardless of any
speculation or proof as to whether they would have
been totally,, or partially unemployed had they not
st ruek ...
The reference in the above to the May 4 night shift deals
with the fact that the company when notified that work would
stop at midnight May 4 relied on that notice and notified the
night shift not to come to work on May 4.
This Court in the case of 0 Iof Nelson Construction Company et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah supra stated:
nit cannot be doubted that the Legislature wanted to
prevent strikes in every possible way. Undoubtedly one
of the considerations prompted the prohibition against
labor receiving benefits for unemployment resulting
from a strike it was responsible for, is the fact that it
would be unfair to use funds built up by labor and
management jointly to support labor in a contest wherein it was exerting economic pressure against management by striking. Even more basic is the fact that if
such were not the rule, the existence of the system would
be hazarded. To permit an employee to become voluntarily unemployed and draw benefits would have these
bad effects: It would tend to encourage work stoppage
and thus bring about economic waste; it would put it
within his power to voluntarily drain off the unemployment compensation fund and thus hazard its
soundness and the accomplishment of its purposes. If
26
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it is bad for one worker to be able to voluntarily become
unemployed and draw benefits a fortiori, it is proportionately worse for greater numbers of groups to
be able to do so. Accordingly the Legislature has expressed its intent that when conflicts arise in connection
with negotiations between labor and management,
unemployment compensation should not be available
to support labor when it is a work stoppage, the responsibility for which is chargeable to a strike initiated by
labor.''
Under the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act,
the unemployment compensation funds are accumulated through
employer contributions only. Although the Olof Nelson case
was dealing with multi-unit bargaining organizations, we think
the following quote from the Olof Nelson case is pertinent to
this issue:
nln these controversies where we have workers represented by their unions arrayed on one side against
management in multi-unit bargaining organizations on
the other, if we are to give effect to the Legislative purpose and intent, the probletn simmers down to: Whose
conduct is really responsible for the work stoppage?
Answering this question may have its difficulties but it
seems to be the only logical means of getting at the
heart of the matter and resolving the conflict."
The Court further states:
CCThus, the critical fact to be determined is whether
the conduct of labor or management is the primary and
initiating cause of the work stoppage, or as phrased by
1'1r. Justice Schauer in the McKinley case: ( ... It was
proper to relate the responsibility for the work stoppage to the party who created its actual and directly
impelling cause.' "
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We respectfully call the Court's attention to the follo•Ning
cases which have dealt at some length with the problem of disqualification during the existence of a work stoppage.
Chrysler Corporation vs. Review Board of Indiana Etuployment Security Division et al, 120 Ind. App. 425, 92 W.E.
2d 565 ( 1950). This was an appeal from a decision of the
appellate court that employees involved in a labor dispute were
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits during the \Vork
v.reek following settlement of the strike, at least part of \vhich
was reasonably required to prepare the plant for normal production.

The Court said at 568:
((Where, as here, a labor dispute causes a work stoppage and as a result of such stoppage it is necessary
to make repairs before the plant can resume operations
on a normal basis, employees involved in the labor
dispute are not eligible for the benefits of the Act
for unemployment during the time reasonably necessary
to prepare the plant for normal operations. However,
as stated by Judge Bowen of the Court in the case of
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v. Review Board
of Indiana Employment Security Division 1947, 117
Ind. App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662, 667: (The test is not the
resumption of operations by reason of the control or
decision of the employer or conditions and speculative
factors allegedly asserted by the employer. It must be
limited to the delay directly and proximately caused
by the labor dispute and the physical factors and conditions created as the direct and natural consequences
of the labor dispute.' "
((Where the unemployment is originally caused by
a labor dispute, before an employee will be entitled
to the benefits of the Act, he has the burden of proving
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his continued unemployment is not the result of the
labor dispute but is caused by some other condition
beyond his control. Frank Foundries Corporation v.
Board of Review, etc., supra; Auker v. Review Board,
Indiana Employment Security Division, 1947, 117 Indiana Appellate 486, 494, 70 N.E. 2d 29, 71 N.E.
2d 629 (transfer denied) ; Employees of Utah Fuel
Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 1940,
99 Utah 88, 104 P 2d 197.
c·on the record before us in this case, the conclusion
is inescapable that the employer did everything that
was reasonably possible to promptly restore its plant
to a normal production basis."

Carnegie-Illinois Steel G'orp-oration v. 1~he Review Board
of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al, 117 Ind.
App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662.
The Court held that where all production ceased on January 21, because of a strike, which terminated on February 18,
and work was partially resumed on February 23, but was not
fully resumed until March 16, employees were not entitled
to unemployment benefits until March 16, since, until then,
stoppage of work was ((because," which means <cby reason
of" of a labor dispute within the Employment Security Act and
concurrence of labor dispute and stoppage of work was unnecessary.
The Court cited from the brief of the union as follows:
CThe question before the court is whether a stoppage
of work immediately subsequent to a labor dispute
\vhich stoppage of work would not have occurred except
(our italics) for the labor dispute disqualifies employees
involved in the labor dispute during the subsequent
stoppage."
c
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In substance the instant case involves an identical issue.
The Court quoted the Indiana Act:
3} An individual shall be ineligible for waiting
period or benefit rights: ... for any week with respect
to which the board finds that his total or partial or
part-total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work
which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory,
establishment, or other premises at which he was last
employed . . . "
t(

(

Deleted are certain escape provisions.
The Court in discussing the matter as to whether the labor
dispute and the stoppage tnust be both considered in the present
tense stated:
((There are two types of statutes in the states and
territories of this country dealing with disqualifications
for unemployment benefits. The one type such as the
Wisconsin statute, which provides for disqualification
for benefits, (for any week in which such strike or other
bona fide labor dispute is in active progress (our italics)
in the establishment in which he is or was last employed,'
is in effect in a number of states. The other type is the
one as is in effect in this state, and does not contain
the words qr requirement that a strike be in active
progress in order to disqualify a worker for benefits.
Considering the legislative history of such enactments
it is not unreasonable to assume that if the legislature
of this state had intended to require that a strike be in
active progress in order to disqualify a worker for
benefits it would have enacted the active progress type
of statute. Similarly we feel it is not unreasonable to
assume that had the legislature intended that the stoppage of 'vork and the labor dispute had to be coexistent
it 'vould have made its intent clear through some ]an-
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guage such as the insertion of the word 'existing'
following the words 'labor dispute' in the section in
question.''
''The word 'because' in the statute means 'by reason
of.' The legislature intended to disqualify workers
for benefits where the stoppage of work was caused
by a labor dispute under the conditions set forth in
Section 7 (f) ( 3) of the Act even though such stoppage
and dispute were not concurrent. The stoppage of work
n1ust exist during the week for which benefits are
claimed, but not necessarily during the existence of
the labor dispute.
"The only factors which could have caused the stoppage of work as shown by the record were the conditions in the plant which existed because of the shutdown of the plant by reason of the labor dispute, and
the time necessary to repair coke ovens, the hearths of
blast furnaces, and other repair items necessary before
production could be resumed after the shut-down.
''We hold that the Review Board was in error, in
its conclusion, that the unemployment following the
settlement of the labor dispute and resulting from
this fact was not due to a stoppage of work by a labor
dispute. We further hold that . . . the Review Board
was in error in concluding that a stoppage of work must
exist at the same time, or concurrently, before a worker
is disqualified.''
In Bako et al v. Unemployment Compensation Board of
Review, 171 Pa. Supr. 222, 90 A 2d 309, the Court held that
disqualification of the statute providing that employees shall
be ineligible for compensation during a period of unemployment due to work stoppage as a result of a labor dispute is
not limited to the time of the strike, but includes the period
preceding the strike during which the employer curtails opera-
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tions to conserve property, and a reasonable period following
the strike, until the plant can be returned to normal operations.
See also American Steel Foundries v. Gordon et al, 404
Ill. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465; Fort Pitt Manufacturing Company
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa.
Supr. 162, 106 A 2d 672.
The direct and impelling cause of the work stoppage
which caused the unemployment for which benefits are claimed
was the existence of the simultaneous strikes which involved
all of the claimants who are appealing. While the members
of Local 1438, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, failed to give timely notice of intention to strike to the
state Labor Relations Board in time to ((legalize" their strike
they were tton strike'' by reason of their withholding of their
services by honoring the picket lines. This Court in the case
of Gus P. Lexes et al vs. The Industrial Commission of Utah,
243 P. 2d 964, stated:
((Although the inquiry did not proceed upon the
theory that claimants engaged in the strike, the undisputed facts show that this was the case. Neither the
fact that they had no dispute with the employer, nor
that their work stoppage was not called a strike, are
controlling. A strike is generally defined to be a concerted action of employees in withholding services
from their employer. Any such concerted action in
refusing to perform services is a strike, no matter
'vhat the action may be called, nor for whatever purpose it may have been initiated."
In the case of Pacific States Cast 11'on Pipe Co. v. Industrial Con1mission of Utab, 41 A 104, 139 P. 2d 208~ this Court
stated:
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''In Bodinson Mfg. Company vs. California Employment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P 2d 935,
the question was whether the applicant 'left his work
because of a trade dispute.' Striking welders established
a picket line through which applicant and others declined to go. It appears there was only peaceful
picketing and no threat of any kind. The Supreme
Court of California held that as the applicant was not
physically prevented from working, but he merely exercised the choice of following union principles by
not going through the picket line, he was not out of
work involuntarily and he was not eligible for unem·
ployment compensation. In Re Persons Employed, etc.
7 Washington 2d 580, 110 P 2d 877, the Court held
that inasmuch as members of the union which did not
call a strike agreed not to go through a picket line
established by another union, they were thereby participating in a labor dispute and there was no need for
determining whether or not applicants were of the same
'class' of workers as the strikers or whether they were
employed in a separate unit of the company."
The company determined that it was neither economically
feasible nor safe to activate the company-owned power plant
to supply power for the smelter and refinery in order to work
off the stockpile of ore. Instead the company purchased the
necessary power from public sources. The work stoppage at
the establishment did not end until on or about February 6,
1960. The electrical workers continued to honor picket lines
except for those who obtained permits to cross the picket lines
in order to do maintenance work as was arranged with the
company. The continued unemployment of the power plant
employees was due to their continuing to honor the picket
lines and the lack of resumption of such operations which "'ould
permit the economic and safe operation of the power plant.
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With respect to the smelter workers, the stoppage of
work, i.e. lack of normal or substantial operations, continued
at the establishment even during the processing of the stockpile of ore. During the actual processing of the stockpile
at the smelter the unernployment of the workers ceased. After
the stockpile was processed the work stoppage which was due
to the initial strike continued. The establishment could not
resume operations until every local had settled and agreed
to a resumption of work. If, as was pointed out in the Olof
Nelson case, supra,
((It was proper to relate the responsiblity for the
work stoppage to the party who created its actual and
directly impelling cause,"
then the claimants must be charged with the responsibility for
the work stoppage both before and after the processing of the
stockpile. There is no showing by the claimants that the continued work stoppage was due to anything other than the
initial simultaneous strikes of the several unions. The company did not have the duty or the opportunity to resume
operations on a normal or substantial basis until on or about
February 6., 1960. When normal operations became possible,
the company promptly recalled its workers. The evidence
shows that the refinery could not operate in November when
the recall began because of the deterioration which had taken
place because of the strike-caused work stoppage. It was found
that only a part of the refinery workers could be recalled
due to such condition, and the rna jor portion of these were
used in repair and maintenance to put the refinery back into
a condition suitable for production.
The \vork stoppage at the establishment ended for all
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workers, including those represented by the International Union
of Mine, ~fill and Smelter Workers and Office Employees'
International union, on or about February 6, 1960; and, therefore, only workers not called back after that date can be considered e1 igible for benefits.
Because the factual situation tn this case is unique due
to the existence of many union bargaining groups, this is in
part at least a case of first impression. We have a simultaneous
strike or direct involvement in the strike by some eighteen
different locals. After striking at the same time, the locals
settled at different times. Because of the over-all unity of
operations the failure of even the smallest local to reach a
settlement prevented resumption of normal production and
no general recall of workers could begin. The strike of no one
local was any more the cause of the initial work stoppage
than was the strike of any other or all other locals. Once the
work stoppage commenced it could end only with a settlement
by all.
The Utah Act provides that the worker shall be ineligible
for benefits during each week when:
his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work
which exists because of a strike involving his grade,
class, or group . . . "
n

•••

There can be no denying that a stoppage of work existed at
the establishment until February 6, 1960. In fact, the benefit
claims of these claimants are based on that stoppage. The
direct and impelling cause of the stoppage was the initial
strike. Each of the claimants herein was involved in that strike.
Being so involved, can he escape further disqualification
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after his bargaining group has settled its issues and has ceased
to be presently actively involved-keeping in mind that this
was a concerted simultaneous strike action? While the evidence does not conclusively show that there was a multibargaining group identical to the Olof Nelson case, supra,
there was a joint pre-strike presentation of demands and an
after-strike publicity campaign-BR-235 (R. 004). The effect
of these was to present a united front to create greater bargaintng pressure.
In view of the decisions of this and other courts supra,
it appears to be well settled that claimants are ineligible for
benefits during the weeks when they are actively on strike;
honoring picket lines; out of work because of repairs and
maintenance made necessary by the strike; and when they
are on vacation or are not available for work. Our principle
concern then is with the claims which were filed after the
respective contract settlement and for the weeks when none
of these other disqualifying situations existed. The basic issue
is whether or not the unemployment in these latter weeks was
due to the action of the claimants themselves or whether it
was, after contract settlement, existing only because of the
failure of the other unions to reach settlements and whether
or not the involven1ent of the claimants in the initial strike
may be disregarded in order to allow benefits.
We think that the better rule is that when members of
one local union participate in a simultaneous strike the purpose
of which is to cause a complete stoppage of \vork at the
establishment such members should be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits during the
period or periods when the employer is powerless to resume

36

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

operations because the members of one or more of such other
striking unions remain on strike.
There \Vas a sufficient joining of forces by the unions _______ _
___________________________________________________ _in presenting demands prior to
the strike and advertising a united position during the strike
___________ --------------__________ --------------------------------_____ to establish a joint
responsibility for the work stoppage. Their actions made them
a cohesive pressure group with all the claimants involved in
the action causing the stoppage. At the time of the joint strike,
the claimants were fully aware of the fact that normal operations could not be resumed at the establishment until all
bargaining units had settled and were willing to return to
work. In the face of this situation they joined with members
of the other unions in the strike with each local union taking
the proper strike vote and going on strike on August 10.
The fact that the bargaining subsequent to the strike was
continued by respective bargaining representatives does not
remove the joint responsibility for the work stoppage which
existed until February 6, 1960. Although the following quote
from the Olaf Nelson case supra is not applicable in all
respects to the instant case, it succinctly sets out the Court's
view of the legislative intent of the statute in denying benefits
to members of striking units.
The original provision passed in 1935 stated:
(An employee shall not be entitled to benefits: _ ..
( 3) If he has left or lost his employment due to a
trade dispute involving the employer by whom he
was employed, so long as such trade dispute continues, _ . . ' Ch. 38, Section 8 ( 3), Limitation on
Payment of Benefits, Laws of Utah 1935. (Emphasis
added".)
37
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c

(The following year the statute was amended to read:

(An individual shall be ineligible for benefits ...
(d) For any week in which it is found by the commission that his total or partial [total or partial,
now deleted] unemployment is due to a stoppage of
work which exists because of a strike involving his
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or
establishment at which he is or was last employed.'
((Subdivision ( 1) was then added, which provides:

elf the commission, upon investigation, shall find
that a strike has been fomented by a worker of any
employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or
group of workers of the individual who is found to
be a party to such plan, or agreement to foment a
strike, shall be eligible for benefits;' Ch. 1, Sec. 5,
Disqualification for Benefits; Laws of Utah, Special
Session 1936.

CCW e do not believe that the amendment in 1936 was
intended to change the fundamental theory of disqualification stated in the 1935 act. The amendment
was designed to refine and clarify the disqualification
prov1s1on. Expression of this theory of ineligibility
was no easy matter. The emphasis in the original provision is that no benefits were to be paid where the
unemployn1ent was due to a trade dispute involving
the employer of the claimant. The 1936 amendment
substituted the words: (work stoppage caused by a
strike' for (trade dispute' and (involving his grade,
class or group of workers at the factory or establishment at which he is or was last employed' for (involving
the employer by whom he was last employed.' It makes
no difference whether the principle of disqualification
is expressed in terms, relating to the employer or the
employee. In order to have a trade dispute involving
the employer, or a strike involving the grade, class or
group of workers, there must exist an employment
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relationship. In both the 1935 and 1936 versions of
disqualification, it is the temporary termination of the
employment relationship which is being described. The
purpose of adding sub-division ( 1) was to make it
clear that the meaning of the 19 35 act was not to be
changed. Benefits were not to be paid where a strike
or trade dispute involved either the employer or the
grade, class, or group of workers at their place of
employment, in such a way as to cause the unemployment or work stoppage. None of the workers of the
grade, class or group of workers of the individual who
is found to be a party to such plan or agreement to
foment a strike shall be eligible for benefits.
"This construction of these two provisions, 42-2a-5
(d) and (d) ( 1) is consistent with the interpretation
given them in Members Iron Workers Union of Provo
v. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208. In that
case, the Iron Workers Union was defeated in an
election which certified the rival Steel Workers Organizing Committee (S. W. 0. C.) as the bargaining
agent at the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. The
S. W. 0. C. called a strike . .1-lthough the members of
the Iron Workers' Union did not participate in the
strike vote, they refused to cross the picket line and
subsequently sought unemployment compensation benefits. Mr. Justice McDonough, speaking for this court,
at page 2 52 of the U tab Reporter, stated:
(If a strike involves his ((grade, class or group'·
of workers, an employee is ineligible to unemployment benefits when stoppage of work is ((caused"
by members thereof. The words ugrade" and Hclass"
have reference generally to the type of work being
performed, as to skills or as to expertness in those
skills. The word ((group" may be synonymous in
a given instance with ((class or grade", but it may
include several classes or grades or even involve the
vvorkers of an entire plant. A strike involves the
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((grade, class, or group" of an employee within the
meaning of the statute if the dispute which results
in the strike is with reference to wages, hours or
conditions of employment of a group of which he is
a member . . . The provisions of (d) ( 1) hereinabove quoted, providing that where a strike is fomented by an employee, the workers who are of his
((grade, class, or group" are ineligible for benefits
serves to make clear that the construction here given
of the quoted words voices the legislative intent.
It is not only those who foment the strike or bring
it abottt who are ineligible, but the group to which
such persons belong-however inclusive-the group
for whose benefit the strike is called.' (Italics added".
CONCLUSION
We think that the legislative intent to disqualify claimants
who go on a strike from receiving unemployment compensation
benefits during the entire work stoppage or until there is a
showing that after a certain date the work stoppage was in no
way connected with the initial strike.
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the Commission
and the Board of Review did not err in denying unemployment
compensation benefits to the claimants herein.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
FRED F. DREMANN
Special Assistant Attorney General
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & MOFFAT
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation
ELLIOTT W. EVANS
Attorneys for Respondents

40
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

